Second, in terms of collective action, scholars must concern themselves with questions about how global institutional processes affect traditional, state level politics and capacities. If inter-state relationships and treaties are becoming more important, then state decisions and practices are constrained to varying degrees by their relationships with other states and economic elites. How have these global processes affected opportunities for social movement actors that have forged their action repertoires through primarily nationally-oriented contention? Moreover, how do differences in power and interests among states affect opportunities for challengers to exert leverage? To date, relations between social movements and inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations have been largely accommodative, but Seattle highlights a more contentious history of relations between popular groups and inter-governmental financial institutions.
What does this contrast tell us about the nature of the contemporary global political system and of the role of social movements within it? This paper traces the origins and mobilizing structures behind the Seattle contention and analyzes the tactics of this protest and their relevance to international institutional contexts. By asking both who and what constituted the Battle of Seattle, this analysis seeks to advance understandings of how global integration impacts the character of social movement mobilization and action.
Background: The Seattle Ministerial
The original WTO agreement passed in 1994 committed member states to seeking a Millennium Round of talks to progressively expand trade liberalization policies under the WTO. The United States and other Western nations were strong advocates of a continued expansion of the WTO regime, and they made extensive efforts to advance these goals in the lead-up to the Seattle meeting. 5 For many states in the global South, however, the WTO had proved to be a disappointment. Although attracted to the agreement by the promise of more accessible decision making than is found in other global financial institutions, 6 Southern governments found themselves left out of important decisions taken in the WTO as key deliberations were held largely in closed-door meetings organized by
Intelligence Service (2000) noted the need for advanced security measures at international financial meetings. And the discourse at a meeting of the world's bankers and economists revealed elite attempts to respond to widespread "antipathy toward free market competition" (Stevenson 2000) . 5 Seeing that there was likely to be difficulty reaching an agreement on a Millennium Round, late in the lead-up to the Ministerial Conference President Clinton called upon heads of state to attend the meeting and show their support for WTO expansion. Only Fidel Castro signalled a willingness to take him up on the offer. 6 Voting in the WTO provides one vote per country member, but in the IMF and World Bank it is weighted the core states (the United States, Canada, European Union, and Japan, referred to as "the Quad"). Agreements defined by Quad states were then forced upon Southern members who were most vulnerable to the pressures of these powerful economic actors (Vidal 1999; Zoll 1999) . Southern governments also saw fewer economic rewards from expanded trade under the WTO than they had expected. The Southern countries' agenda was therefore to review existing agreements and to make them more equitable rather than to support a Millennium Round whose agenda was to expand the WTO regime under rules they saw as highly skewed towards Western and corporate interests. 7 This division among states was an important cause of the ultimate breakdown of talks in Seattle. In addition to this NorthSouth split among WTO member governments, a further challenge remained in divisions between European and U.S.
interests over food safety and agricultural issues. In short, going into the Third Ministerial, governments faced difficult prospects for staging a successful meeting. All hope of bridging the North-South gap was effectively lost when President Clinton succumbed to pressure from protesters and called for efforts to protect labor within the WTO.
The social movement forces allied against the WTO expansion certainly contributed to this state of affairs.
European governments felt pressures from constituent groups who were highly mobilized in opposition to genetically modified foods and to WTO rules that would limit their ability to reject trade in such products. Farmers represent a strong constituency in many European countries, thereby complicating efforts to cut subsidies and other agricultural supports. Governments in the global South benefitted from analyses of the WTO provided by researchers who have served as intellectual leaders of the movement. 8 Moreover, their ability to present a cohesive challenge to the political dominance of the United States and other "Quad" states in the WTO was certainly bolstered by their knowledge that it was Quad governments' own citizens who were protesting the meetings. A more detailed counterfactual analysis would have a hard time making the case that the Seattle Ministerial would have failed as miserably as it did without the tens of thousands of protesters surrounding the meeting site.
The major slogan of the protests was "no WTO" (or "hell no, WTO" if you were a steel worker or Teamster), but there was no clear consensus among protest groups about whether the WTO itself should be abolished or reformed. But it was clear that virtually all protesters in the streets of Seattle sought the incorporation of values other than profit-making into economic decisions and the democratization of economic decision making.
These goals, moreover, could not be promoted effectively in national contexts for a number of reasons.
First, for citizens of countries with small markets and little economic power, attempting to affect their own countries' policies was useless, since these governments could have little impact on the ultimate outcomes of international processes. Second, in countries like the United States (as well as within global economic institutions), economic policies are considered technical, not political, decisions and are conducted largely in the U.S. Treasury Department according to a government's financial contribution, and the U.S. enjoys the largest voting share (nearly 20%). 7 The WTO rules, for instance, progressively liberalize tariffs and other trade restrictions over a set period. Rules for different categories of goods vary, so that tariffs on primary commodities-i.e., those that are exported from the South to the North-remain high until the end of the WTO phase-in period, while those on manufactured goods are reduced more rapidly. Moreover, most of the rules take 1994 tariff and subsidy levels as the starting point, so the Southern countries that typically had less extensive sets of tariffs and minimal agricultural subsidies were prevented from adding new ones, even as they were forced to compete in a market dominated by countries that had relatively high tariffs and subsidies to protect their domestic industries (see Khor 1999 Shoch 2000; Naím 2000) . But the opposition to neoliberal trade policy in Seattle can be traced to even earlier roots.
Perhaps the first stream of resistance began in developing countries themselves, where resistance to IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies arose as countries of the global South sought to address a mounting problem of international debt (Walton and Seddon 1994) . Environmental and human rights campaigners increasingly found themselves involved in efforts to curb World Bank lending for projects that threatened peoples and ecosystems in the global South (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rich 1994 (Scholte 2000; Gerhards and Rucht 1992) , and an international "fifty years is enough" campaign emerged in the mid-1990s to mobilize against the 1995 "celebration" of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference and the founding of the World Bank and IMF.
Research on social movements has shown that formal social movement organizations (SMOs) play important roles in framing movement agendas, cultivating collective identities, and mobilizing collective actions. At the same time, churches, community organizations, friendship networks, and professional associations often engage in similar kinds of protest-oriented activities (even though these are not the principal purposes of these organizations) while providing resources for movements. The more routine contacts of these "extra-movement" groups with broad segments of society promote wider participation and legitimacy for social movements (McCarthy 1996) . The anti-WTO protests in Seattle attracted a large number of "extra-movement" organizations and informal networks such as churches and professional associations whose principal organizational purpose is something other than furthering social change goals. Many churches and unions have standing committees that work on social justice or solidarity issues, thereby bringing elements of these organizations into routine participation in social movements. These extramovement groups contributed substantially to the Seattle protests' impact. Of particular importance were the many labor unions from around the United States who provided the logistical and financial support that enabled their members to participate in an entire week of protest and educational activity. 9 As in other movements, churches played an important role by disseminating information about the protests and by providing meeting spaces, legitimacy, and other resources. School groups, in particular those organized to oppose sweatshop labor, also helped raise awareness of and generate participation in protests. In addition, organizers of the protest events in Seattle worked consciously to cultivate ties with community groups and with an active social movement sector in the Pacific Northwest.
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But the Seattle protests also built upon transnational mobilizing structures that shaped the organizational leadership, strategies, and tactics that organizers adopted. For instance, the rapid expansion in the numbers of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) during the past fifty years provided a growing number of activists with substantive knowledge of the political views of groups from different parts of the world, opportunities to gain skills and experience in international organizing work, expertise in international law, and familiarity with multilateral negotiation processes (Sikkink and Smith, forthcoming) . The growth of TSMOs generated opportunities for transnational dialogues on conflictual issues and helped organizers combine interests and coordinate policy 9 Labor organizations have typically been considered outside at least the contemporary U.S. social movement sector because of their historical association with institutionalized politics and their tendency to focus on member services and contract negotiations rather than class struggle. In practice, some U.S. labor organizations resemble SMOs in their approach to struggle, most notably the longshoremen's union, which has traditionally emphasized radical confrontation and class solidarity (Levi and Olson 2000) . The experience of labor in the Battle of Seattle and contemporary debates within the AFL-CIO suggest a possibility that labor issues could take a more contentious turn vis-a-vis political institutions. Social movement scholars may find need to re-think their assumptions about relationships between the social movement sector and organized labor in the U.S. 10 The Internet site for one of the main umbrella coalitions, People crucial for sustaining any long-term social movement mobilization, and groups seeking to build alliances across national boundaries (e.g., where routine face-to-face contact is rare) in particular must engage in deliberate efforts to define "who we are" if they are to sustain activists' commitment.
Transnational SMOs must demonstrate wide geographic representation in order to be effective in multilateral politics, and cultivating such a membership requires these organizations to create spaces for dialogues and negotiations about common goals and strategies . In the process of building coalitions and negotiating joint strategies, activists learn each others' positions and, where conditions favor it, build relationships and trust that are crucial for ongoing cooperation (Rose 2000) . For instance, while Western environmental and labor activists might accept a policy of promoting environmental and labor protections through existing WTO mechanisms, dialogues with their counterparts in developing countries led to a position opposing the extension of WTO authority into other areas. As a result, the common statement endorsed by nearly 1500 citizens'
organizations from 89 countries called on governments to adopt "a moratorium on any new issues or further negotiations that expand the scope and power of the WTO" and to review existing agreements and address their negative impacts on human and labor rights, health, women's rights, and the environment. 12 While it is difficult to determine the impacts of these kinds of joint statements, the process of preparing the statements and, for many groups, the decisions about whether or not to sign on to them, involve conscious deliberations about shared interests and identities.
Table 1 maps out the organizational structure of major organizational participants in the anti-WTO actions in Seattle in order to outline the distribution of transnational associational ties in that event. between groups with formalized transnational ties and those with diffuse ties. The groups with no ties or with more diffuse transnational ties and also more informal and decentralized organizational forms were principally involved in mobilizing and education as well as in the coordination of efforts to "shut down" the meetings. The groups with 11 Organizational identities result from activists' association of their personal identity with a particular SMO. Such identification can precede or lead to movement and solidary identities. Movement identities refer to the association of the goals and values of a movement with one's own, and solidary identities involve the inclusion of the individual or group in a wider community of fate. Examples of the latter would include class identities or identities such as victims of corporate exploitation. 12 The "Statement from Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium Round or a New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations" can be found at: www.citizen.org/pctrade/mai/Sign-ons/WTOStatement.htm. more routine and formalized transnational connections were also involved in education and mobilization, but they tended to play more important roles in framing and informing protester critiques of the global trading system and in lobbying government delegations. They supported other groups' mass mobilization efforts by, for instance, developing educational materials, speaking at rallies and teach-ins, and bringing in speakers from the global South.
There was some evidence of conflict across this division of labor, but this did not appear to seriously undermine protest efforts in Seattle.
Groups with no formal transnational ties are principally local chapters of national groups and local groups formed around the anti-WTO mobilization. In addition, United for a Fair Economy is a national group focused on critiques of inequalities in the U.S. economy. These groups were important to the mobilization of local activists to participate in Seattle protests, and often they worked with or were mobilized because of groups like Direct Action Network, Public Citizen, or others with more extensive transnational ties. Groups with diffuse ties include regional organizations whose memberships cross the U.S.-Canada border and or groups with other transnational ties that grow out of their organizing efforts. For instance, the Berkeley based Ruckus Society (whose leaders include former
Students for a Democratic Society organizers) primarily brings together Canadians and Americans for nonviolence training. The Coalition for Campus Organizing works to facilitate progressive organizing on college campuses, and it has taken on international work focusing on sweatshops and educational issues, including those raised by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 13 Its international work has led to cooperation with student organizations in Canada.
Organizations listed as having "routine" transnational ties typically are national organizations whose main organizational work is at the national level but which have staff devoted to international organizing or solidaritybuilding, have formed standing committees for work on international issues (e.g., Sierra Club, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen) or whose operations involve routine communication and sustained cooperation with activists from other countries (e.g., Global Exchange, USAS). In practice, the transnational interpersonal and inter-organizational contacts these organizations develop can substantially affect their organizational agendas and frames.
In contrast to these associations, organizations with formal transnational structures incorporate transnational cooperation and communication into their operational structures. Groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have a federated structure, with national level branches that help disseminate information on global campaigns and tailor it to national needs. The headquarters of these organizations facilitate research and information exchange and, in the case of Greenpeace, conduct global level direct action protests as well as lobbying. The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) represents another transnational organizational form that is appropriately labeled as a "cadre organization." A collection of experts on globalization issues from around the world, the IFG has, since its founding in 1994, produced educational materials and organized "teach-ins" on the impacts of global financial integration. Unions, for instance, held its annual conference in Seattle just prior to the WTO gathering, bringing with them labor leaders from over 100 countries. International exchanges promoting labor solidarity forced U.S. labor leaders in particular to confront the more isolationist and nationalist positions that have characterized large U.S. unions in the past. Churches and labor unions often entail potential for transnational association, given that the religious and class identities such organizations promote transcend national boundaries. Because they help bridge global identities and interests with routine social activities, to the extent that labor and religious alliances can be sustained in this movement to transform the global trade regime, they will be important structures for advancing transnational mobilization and dialogue.
This overview of the organizational makeup of the Seattle protests demonstrates that globalization processes have affected the ways that social movements mobilize and organize. It reveals substantial transnational ties among some of the key organizations behind the protests. While the masses of protesters were largely from cities around the United States and Canada, there was substantial representation from other parts of the world, particularly among the speakers at protest rallies and teach-ins. 16 Many of the activists from poor countries who traveled to Seattle did so as a consequence of their participation in transnational associations.
17
Transnational ties range from diffuse ones which grow out of shared purposes to more formal links institutionalized in transnational organizational structures. In between, we find a number of national movement organizations innovating organizational mechanisms to help them incorporate transnational communication and cooperation into their ongoing movement work. While this paper presents only a snapshot of the actors in a single which were on the agenda for the failed Seattle talks. 14 Smith (1997) found that transnational SMOs formed after 1970 were more likely than those formed in earlier decades to take the form of coalitions (organizations of organizations) rather than federations (a hierarchical structure of transnational organization with affiliated national sections). 15 With the exceptions of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (both formed in 1971) and Third World Network (formed in 1984), the transnational SMOs listed here were formed during the 1990s. 16 Activists and scholars from the global South were 30-40% of the panelists at the largest protest rallies and People's Assembly 17 Data on transnational social movement organizations shows a trend towards greater participation from countries in the global South (Smith 2000) . Moreover, United Nations conferences held in the global South drew transnational protest event, seen in conjunction with prior mobilizations and with other evidence on transnational SMOs (Smith 2000) , the data support the argument that social movements have developed more formalized, integrated, and sustained organizational mechanisms for transnational cooperation around global social change goals.
This organizational development is reinforced by the political demands of the global policy process as well as by the political socialization and identity construction that takes place within movements. Such movement socialization helps participants not only develop critical understandings of global interdependencies and policy processes, but it also builds relationships and trust across boundaries by cultivating shared organizational, movement, and solidary identities.
Global Political Processes and Movement Tactics
Changes within the global political order, or global polity, parallel change processes characterizing the much earlier rise of national polities. Specifically, they both involved cooperative and conflictual interactions between states, polity members, and challengers. Global institutions are formally controlled by states, but historical analyses have shown that social movement challengers have played influential roles in defining the structures and purposes of these institutions through their interventions in domestic and multilateral policy processes (Chatfield 1997; Finnemore 1996; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Smith 1995) . States are nested within an increasingly complex and consequential web of transnational relations and institutions which both increase their ability to limit external threats --such as those arising from financial and environmental interdependence --while at the same time expanding their vulnerability to social movement challengers. The latter occurs as global institutions create new arenas for challengers to question state agendas and to cultivate alliances with powerful actors outside the domestic political arena. At the same time, the centralization of political authority at the global level raises the costs of effective political challenges, forcing social movements to cultivate organizations and resources that are appropriate to this much broader arena of political action if they hope to affect local changes that are governed by international institutional arrangements.
If political authority is in fact moving towards global institutions, then we should expect to find the kinds of changes in social movement repertoires that Tilly observed with the rise of national polities during the 19 th century.
Novel to that period were the formation of special-purpose associations and the targeting of more remote, national structures by collective actors. These changes paralleled the rise of national electoral politics:
The distinctive contribution of the national state was to shift the political advantage to contenders who could mount a challenge on a very large scale, and could do so in a way that demonstrated, or even used, their ability to intervene seriously in regular national politics. In particular, as electoral politics became a more important way of doing national business, the advantage ran increasingly to groups and organizers who threatened to disrupt or control the routine games of candidates and parties. (Tilly 1984:311) By the late twentieth century, the growth of international institutions appears to have shifted at least some political substantially larger numbers of representatives from Southern organizations (Clark et al. 1998 An important part of the protests in Seattle and elsewhere were the educational actions, which included speaker panels and other events to educate the public about economic globalization and its effects on local policies and democratic institutions. "Teach-ins," first used in the anti-Vietnam war protests (Gamson 1991) , were employed throughout the United States and Canada (and possibly elsewhere) to educate citizens about the global policy process and the rules and consequences of the WTO. They served as important low-cost and low-risk opportunities for sympathizers to begin or reinforce their involvement in the movement. In Seattle, many of these teach-ins brought together labor activists with other groups, enabling dialogues that were unlikely to happen elsewhere. As was true of the first teach-in, these events were spaces where participants' commitment and identity with a growing movement and with other victims of "corporate-led globalization" was cultivated. Rather than focusing on the national policies of the U.S., the emphasis of speakers at these events was on the entire global trade regime and the variety of state policies that shape and are shaped by this regime. While mass media coverage of the anti-WTO resistance focused on the street protests, more long-term damage to official trade policies may have been done in the churches, union halls, and schools where activists and the public were engaging in global civic education.
Activists furthered their mobilization efforts by encouraging organizing around the Seattle event among groups such as students, churches, and other social movement groups, and by drawing new sympathizers into existing organizations and networks. A particular effort was made --primarily by the Direct Action Network --to develop "affinity groups" that would allow coordination among activists while preserving local participation, flexibility and responsiveness, and helping provide protection from police repression. Such affinity groups resembled strategies used in earlier U.S. movements and is characteristic of the large anarchist contingent in the Seattle protests.
Public protests also served to generate awareness of the issues and to encourage sympathizers to become involved in the movement. Although protests typically rely upon media coverage to help spread their message, they also reach a number of audiences more directly (see, e.g., Lipsky 1968) . One important function of mass rallies and protests is to create a relatively (in many Western contexts) low-cost means for people to participate in a movement.
Participation in protests, moreover, serves to motivate and encourage movement sympathizers and adherents, as the act of protesting creates and nurtures activist identities by dramatizing conflict and polarizing identities in "us versus them" terms. It can generate new levels of commitment on the part of activists (see McAdam 1988; Gamson 1991).
When protesters face repression by agents of the state-particularly the extreme physical violence and large numbers of arrests used in Seattle -this effect is amplified.
Protest also affects the dissemination of information about movement goals to a wider public. The participants in protests affect the ways their own organizations and informal networks of family and friends perceive the protests and interpret media frames. They do so by providing alternative sources of information from mainstream media frames or by encouraging friends and kin to pay greater attention to the public discourse on the protests than they otherwise would. In addition, when protesters themselves interact with bystanders near protest settings, they can convey different interpretations of the protest purposes and goals than the mass media do.
Another strategy for mobilizing new sympathizers into the movement involved the adaptation of a previous protest form to promote "MAI free zones." This tactic grew from the successful campaign during 1998 to block a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which would have liberalized rules on international investment. Activists argued that governments were seeking to revive the MAI in the WTO negotiations, threatening to restrict the ability of local governments to control local economic decisions (see Barlow and Clarke 1998) . The MAI was thus seen as a fundamental threat to democratic decision making at the local level, presenting the possibility of recruiting local public officials to the anti-WTO cause. Drawing from the 1980s tactic of declaring "nuclear free zones," movement organizers helped raise questions about how this particular global policy would affect local interests, thus helping to educate local legislators and the public about the ways the WTO agreement impinged on local authority and abortion debate, are less directly affected by multilateral policies and require more local and national emphases.
democracy. It also helped the movement win over some influential and credible allies to their cause. The fact that the Seattle city council declared their city an "MAI-free zone" set an ominous tone for visiting trade delegates who faced an agenda full of proposals to advance variations of the MAI within the WTO framework.
Seattle protesters also took extensive efforts to mobilize symbols and to otherwise frame their messages.
Rather than rely solely on the mainstream media to convey the images of the protests to the general public, activists organized an "Independent Media Center" (IMC) in Seattle, issuing press badges to volunteer photographers, video recorders, and reporters (no formal credentials necessary) wanting to cover the protests. IMC volunteers had access to a press office and could post their reports, pictures and video on a web site that was linked to other movement sites.
In other framing efforts, speakers at teach-ins and other educational events engaged in what might be called Revolution" were a main source of "puppet-ganda" and street theater on WTO issues. The Direct Action Network promoted and facilitated puppet-making, contributing to the protests' festive atmosphere while providing 19 The U.S. caravan was organized by Peoples' Global Action, and it suffered minor setbacks when U.S. officials denied visas to several participants. 20 For instance, despite the ambiguous evidence of trade's affects on poor countries (see UNDP 1998 UNDP , 1999 , in the wake of the failed Seattle talks, WTO Director General Mike Moore stated: "I feel particular disappointment because the postponement of our deliberations means the benefits that would have accrued to developing and least-developed countries will now be delayed . . . and often humorous ways. Banner hangs, where activists risk arrest by scaling buildings and scaffolding to display massive banners, aimed at educating a wider audience about the issues at stake in global conferences. One Seattle banner that survived a few hours before police removed it displayed the word "WTO" with an arrow pointing in one direction followed by "DEMOCRACY" with an arrow pointing in the opposite direction.
Seattle protesters also employed adaptations of symbolic resistance such as the "Boston WTeaO Party."
Here activists appropriated historical symbols of resistance to colonial rule, calling for "no globalization without representation" and dumping into Seattle's harbor rejected products such as shrimp caught with nets that kill endangered sea turtles and steel imported at prices below U.S. production costs. While the WTeaO Party took place, a hero of global protesters, José Bové, resisted globalization not by smashing McDonald's restaurants but by distributing nearly 500 pounds of embargoed Roquefort cheese amid a chorus of protesters' cheers.
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Disruption and confrontation was an important emphasis of many protesters in Seattle, and certainly these activities left the most lasting impressions on much of the mass media audiences watching Seattle's events. The main protest web site and mobilizing flyers called upon activists to "Shut Down Seattle" during the WTO meeting. The direct action training focused on blocking access to the meeting site in order to prevent an agreement to expand the agenda of the WTO. Using "lock down" and "tripod" 23 strategies where activists risked serious physical harm in order to complicate police efforts to remove them, protesters occupied key intersections and forced delegates to stay in their hotels for much of the first meeting day. Delegates who were out on the streets after being turned away from the meetings were "lobbied" by activists taking the opportunity to present their critiques of the WTO and proposals for its expansion.
The activists' blockade rather than property damage actually triggered the initial police response of indiscriminate use of tear gas by mid-morning on November 30 (Author's observation notes; Ackerman 2000:63).
Apparently frustrated by their inability to guarantee delegates' access to the opening ceremony, police took this desperate measure in an effort to clear a path for delegates and prevent the cancellation of the opening session.
Anarchist groups, who had announced their intentions to target downtown shops over protester Internet list servers, did not use violence until after the authorities began the cycle of violent confrontation, which escalated into what was essentially a police riot.
Other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience abounded throughout the week. Some of this activity was directed at communicating protester messages to delegates. Some of the first arrests were of organizers from Global
Exchange who -wearing their NGO access badges that allowed them into the opening ceremony -took the podium and the opportunity to address the handful of delegates who managed to pass through the barricade about the concerns that brought them to Seattle that day. Outside the hall, organizers of the People's Tribunal against "Tribunal." 22 The United States had outlawed the importation of Roquefort cheese and other luxury products after the WTO backed its claim that the EU ban on the import of hormone-treated beef violated trade laws. 23 "Lock-downs" involve the use of chains, bicycle locks, clamps, and PVC pipes to link activists' limbs, making the involuntary removal of any one of the lock-down participants hazardous. The tripod involves three tall poles that are arranged in a tripod and secured by three activists. One activist climbs the poles and sits on or hangs from the tripod. To remove the barricade without causing injury, authorities must bring in a crane or fire truck.
Corporate Crimes were arrested as they crossed police lines to deliver their "indictment" to the leaders of Western industrialized countries of the G-8. Many more protesters were moved by police crackdowns to engage in disruptive protest against the system that they saw brutalizing nonviolent citizens and denying First Amendment rights.
Clogging up jails and hampering police booking procedures through "jail solidarity"(refusing to give names until all arrestees were guaranteed reduced sentences), protesters adopted some classic forms of civil disobedience developed through civil rights and anti-Vietnam war era protests.
While many of the Seattle protesters' tactics reflect adaptations of earlier repertoires, we see some evidence of tactics that are innovative, not in the sense of novelty, but rather in that they are designed to target multilateral political processes. One of the most basic innovations is the creation of transnational associations. Other mobilizing innovations include the production and distribution of a nongovernmental organizational newspaper that presents counter-hegemonic interpretations of official intergovernmental negotiations and highlights the proposals and activities raised by challenger groups during the several days of inter-governmental conferences. Such newspapers have become a routine fixture at intergovernmental conferences on contentious issues, and they have proved important in pressing governments to take up concerns of challenger groups and in providing alternatives to greatpower dominated conference frames. They have been used at many inter-governmental conferences, including those on nuclear disarmament, Law of the Sea, human rights, and women's and environmental issues (Atwood 1997; Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Levering 1997; Willetts 1996) .
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Activists in Seattle and other multilateral contexts engaged in efforts to structure their collective action around official templates. Thus, one of the main coalitions of organizations in Seattle organized a Peoples' Assembly throughout the week of the WTO meeting to parallel official deliberations. In order to incorporate the variety of issues and groups motivating activists, each day was devoted to panels centered on a different agenda item such as environment and health, women, human rights, labor, and agriculture.
Another way that challengers borrow official forms is by getting sympathetic experts or even movement activists onto national delegations to international meetings. Because international negotiations often involve very technical aspects of science and policy, governments must look beyond their traditional diplomatic corps to fill their delegations. In some fields, such as human rights, environment, and women's issues, some of the most widely respected experts are social movement activists. Their expertise on the issues at stake as well as their familiarity with the international negotiation process makes transnational activists a rich resource for governments seeking to influence negotiations. While they are obviously not likely to appear on delegations of countries opposing the changes they seek, activist experts may be invited to sit on delegations of countries that are sympathetic with their change goals. Or they may force their way onto a delegation by using national laws such as the U.S. Federal
Advisory Council Act that requires government advisory panels at international meetings to represent a fair balance of viewpoints. 25 When movement activists or sympathizers find their way onto delegations, they often serve as important conduits of information between official and popular forums. Electronic civil disobedience also becomes possible as commerce and other essential activities are linked to the flow of electronic information. Anti-WTO protesters who could not get to Seattle could satisfy their desire to join in the protests by engaging in electronic "sit-ins" at the WTO Internet site to block legitimate information-seekers' access to the site. In addition, at least one hacker developed a "mirror" site that drew in unwitting information seekers who thought they were viewing the official WTO web page, providing them with a subtly different site that highlighted criticisms of the organization (Seattle Post Intelligencer, November 29, 1999, p. A1). More confrontational "e-protest" takes the form of e-mail and fax-jamming, where large faxes (e.g., protest letters written one word per page) and e-mail messages are sent to disrupt routine flows of information to targets.
Reviewing the tactics employed in Seattle, we find a protest repertoire that both adapts forms that have been typical of national social movement repertoires and expands the repertoire to address multilateral institutional arenas. 
Conclusions
This examination of the Battle of Seattle revealed that protests around global trade liberalization involve extensive transnational mobilizing structures that are likely to (and, indeed, already appear to have) develop further as a consequence of the Seattle mobilization and its impact on collective identity formation. It also showed evidence that tactical repertoires have been altered in specific ways, indicating increased attempts to target actors other than nation states. While states are often the ultimate target of policy changes, challengers face a more complex system of "multi-level governance" (Marks and McAdam 1996) whereby the relations among states become important resources or obstacles to challengers' attempts to impact a given state. And intergovernmental institutions themselves provide targets for mobilization of people in multiple national settings around common policy goals.
When considering the impact of globalization on popular protest, however, the crucial question is not whether globalization diminishes the power of states or the importance of national political processes, but rather how international institutions affect abilities of both states and other elites as well as challengers to influence global political processes. Indeed, many international campaigns ultimately seek to change international policy by shaping the decisions of individual states, and therefore they urge participants to target their own (or sometimes other states') domestic policy processes. An important component of the success at Seattle were the rifts between the U.S. and
European states over agricultural and safety issues and between rich and poor countries over the rules under which trade liberalization is to proceed. So while states indeed do control international institutions, they cannot control all aspects of the day-to-day operations of international organizations. Moreover, they do not stand together as a united front against all challengers. Some states may serve as movement allies on particular issues, or they may see their strategic interests served by movement opposition to other governments' policies. Global activists sought to exploit these divisions among states in their efforts to prevent any agreement at the Seattle Ministerial meeting.
There are other important questions about the impacts of globalization for protest. The repression faced by protesters should raise serious warning flags for scholars of social movements about the ways that globalization affects the practice of democracy (see, e.g., Markoff 1999) . In one of the countries with the most staunchly defended right to free speech and assembly, government officials were able to successfully enforce an illegal "no-protest zone." Moreover, agents in support of the neoliberal trade regime revealed a blatant disdain for democracy. For instance, Slade Gorton, the Republican U.S. Senator from Washington State appeared on the local television news on the night of the N30 protests and vandalism, arguing that Mayor Schell should have declared the entire city a "no protest zone." This comment produced no immediate discussion despite its obvious disregard for the democratic process. Further contempt for democratic principles is apparent in a document from a pro-trade think tank, the Institute for International Economics, which suggests that a strategy for advancing U.S. trade interests should include efforts to eliminate public participation and democratic accountability by, for instance, obfuscating the terms used to refer to "fast track" executive authority. Such authority essentially eliminates a meaningful Congressional role in trade negotiations by forcing the legislative branch to either reject or approve the whole of agreements (Institute for International Economics 1999). 27 Former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz highlights this problem in his critique of the IMF: "Economic policy is today perhaps the most important part of America's interaction with the rest of the world. And yet the culture of international economic policy in the world's most powerful democracy is not democratic" (Stiglitz 2000) .
Beyond infringements of democratic rights, states also retain the ability to inhibit mobilization by, for instance denying visas to activists (as the U.S. did for some Seattle protesters) and by scheduling global meetings in remote locations where democratic rights are not recognized. Singapore was the site of the 1996 WTO ministerial, and future meeting sites are likely to be considerably less open and accessible than Seattle. For instance, the Middle Eastern state of Qatar is being considered as a possible site for the next WTO ministerial meeting. These and other possibilities for states to work together to raise the costs of protest through repression, counter-mobilization, and outright exclusion of activist groups must be considered as we continue to explore the impacts of globalization for democracy and contentious politics.
The Battle of Seattle has triggered a much broader public appreciation for the need to expand public discourse about global policies and to encourage greater transparency and accountability within these institutions.
Activists outside the United States have been inspired by seeing protesters in what one of my informants called a "politically underdeveloped nation" stand up -even in the face of brutal repression --to resist the neoliberal expansion that their own government has been championing for decades. The Battle of Seattle is one of the most significant recent episodes of collective action, and it points to a future of social movements that is increasingly global in both target and in form and that is in more direct confrontation with global institutions than its historical predecessors. McCarthy's (1996) distinction between social movement structures, which are explicitly designed to promote social change goals, and "nonmovement" (here "extra-movement) mobilizing structures. The latter group are important components of social movement, but their basic organizational mandates encompass goals beyond those of social movements. 1 Organizations vary a great deal in their levels of formalization and hierarchy. For instance, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have well defined organizational structures and institutional presences while groups like Peoples Global Action resist forming an organizational headquarters, and Reclaim the Streets seeks to sustain a loose, network-like structure relying heavily on electronic communications. 
